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Our goal in this project is to gain a better empirical understanding of the international financial implications
of currency movements. To this end, we construct a database of international currency exposures for
a large panel of countries over 1990-2004. We show that trade-weighted exchange rate indices are
insufficient to understand the financial impact of currency movements. Further, we demonstrate that
many developing countries hold short foreign-currency positions, leaving them open to negative valuation
effects when the domestic currency depreciates. However, we also show that many of these countries
have substantially reduced their foreign currency exposure over the last decade. Last, we show that
our currency measure has high explanatory power for the valuation term in net foreign asset dynamics:
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In recent years, there has been a wave of research that has emphasized that exchange rate
movements operate through a valuation channel, in addition to their traditional impact on
real-side variables such as the trade balance. The valuation channel refers to the impact
of capital gains and losses on the international balance sheet. While such valuation eﬀects
have always been present, their quantitative signiﬁcance has grown in recent years in line
with the rapid growth in the scale of cross-border ﬁnancial holdings (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2007a). Since currency movements are an important contributor to capital gains
and losses on foreign assets and liabilities, the goal of our project is to gain a better empirical
understanding of the international ﬁnancial impact of shifts in exchange rates.1
This eﬀect varies across countries based on the scale of the international balance sheet,
the net value of the position and the currency composition of foreign assets and liabilities.
For instance, authors such as Tille (2003), Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2003, 2005, 2007b) have highlighted that the foreign liabilities of the United States
are mostly denominated in dollars while there is a substantial non-dollar component in its
foreign assets. Accordingly, unanticipated dollar depreciation improves the net international
investment position of the United States by increasing the dollar value of its foreign assets
relative to its foreign liabilities. In contrast, many emerging markets have historically issued
signiﬁcant amounts of foreign-currency debt — for these countries, currency depreciation has
had an adverse impact on the net foreign asset position.
Although there has been a signiﬁcant expansion in the availability of data on many
dimensions of international balance sheets in recent years, remarkably little is known about
the currency composition of the foreign assets and liabilities of most countries. Accordingly,
a major contribution of our project is to address this data deﬁcit by building an empirical
proﬁle of the international currency exposures of a large number of countries. We exploit
the estimated currency positions to create ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rate indices that
better capture the valuation impact of currency movements relative to standard trade-
weighted indices. In turn, the interaction of the ﬁnancial exchange rate indices and the
gross scale of the international balance sheet allows us to capture the valuation impact of
currency movements on net foreign asset positions. In addition, the currency exposure data
may be useful in evaluating the new wave of global macroeconomic models that endogenize
1Gourinchas and Rey (2007a, 2007b) and Tille (2003, 2005) have made studies of the valuation channel
for the United States, while Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) have examined
valuation eﬀects for a large panel of countries in a variety of settings. See also the review by Obstfeld (2004).
1the composition of international portfolios and analyzing the ‘wealth’ channel of monetary
policy in open economies. Accordingly, the analysis of currency exposure data may pro-
vide new insights on the interaction between ﬁnancial globalization and macroeconomic
behavior.
Our analysis yields three important ﬁndings. First, ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rates
move quite diﬀerently than trade-weighted exchange rates. In particular, we ﬁnd that the
mean and median within-country correlation of trade and ﬁnancial exchange rates is nega-
tive. Many countries have eﬀectively stabilized their ﬁnancial exchange rates by matching
currency exposures on the liability side with corresponding asset positions, leading to stable
ﬁnancial exchange rates even when trade-weighted exchange rates move considerably. For
others, negative net currency positions generate negative correlations with trade weighted
exchange rates or positive positions generate positive (albeit not complete) correlations with
trade weighted exchange rates. In short, trade-weighted exchange rates are not particularly
informative regarding the ﬁnancial impact of shifts in exchange rates, without knowing the
structure of cross-border currency exposures.
Second, in relation to the aggregate net position in foreign currencies, we ﬁnd that the
majority of countries have a net negative exposure, implying that unexpected depreciation
generates wealth losses. These net negative positions are quite large in many cases and
leave countries exposed to substantial valuation losses in the event of a depreciation. At
the same time, over the last decade, many countries have shifted their hedging positions in
a positive direction: shifts to equity and direct investment ﬁnancing of liabilities and large
increases in reserves have been more important in alleviating currency mismatches than
increases in the share of international debt that is denominated in domestic currrency.
Finally, we examine the size and properties of exchange rate valuation shocks. We ﬁnd
that the shocks are substantial and are not reversed by quick exchange rate turnarounds
(the autocorrelation of exchange rate valuation shocks is in fact positive). Furthermore,
the exchange rate valuation shocks calculated based on our indices are good predictors of
the overall valuation shocks an economy faces, especially for developing countries. Their
scale and long-lasting nature means that these wealth shocks may have non-trivial impacts
on the wider economy. In addition, since currency movements lead to cross-border wealth
redistributions, these are especially important for the international transmission mechanism
relative to other asset price shocks.
Our analysis is partial equilibrium in nature, since we eﬀectively treat exchange rate
movements as exogenous. That said, the empirical insights in the paper have implications
for the design of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that feature endogenously-
2determined international portfolios and seek to incorporate the wealth eﬀects of exchange
rate changes that feed back into the economy. Understanding why the exchange rate changes
does not change the positive aspects of our work - the examination of the wealth eﬀects -
but it does have implications in terms of the optimal composition of international portfolios.
Our work is related to several previous contributions on international currency expo-
sures. Along one strand, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) compiled data on
the currency composition of the external debts of developing countries, while Goldstein
and Turner (2004) extend the analysis by constructing estimates of net foreign-currency
debt assets. However, these contributions do not take into account the portfolio equity
and FDI components of the international balance sheet. Tille (2003) calculates the foreign
currency composition of the international balance sheet of the United States, while Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) calculate dollar exposures for a large number of European coun-
tries, plus Japan and China. Relative to these contributions, we provide greatly-expanded
coverage for a large number of countries and estimate the full currency composition of the
international balance sheet.
While our work represents a dramatic improvement relative to the status quo, it is im-
portant to be clear about its limitations. In particular, we have made many assumptions in
constructing our estimated international currency exposures. Moreover, in some cases, we
infer values for missing data by modelling the relation between known country character-
istics and international ﬁnancial holdings. Obviously, estimated data will not be perfectly
accurate, nor will every assumption made ﬁt every country perfectly. We make every eﬀort
to cross-check our data where possible and we detail and defend the choices made in the
appendix describing our data methods.
After describing the conceptual basis of the valuation channel in the next section, Section
3 provides a brief outline of the methods employed to construct the currency position data;
the appendix provides a detailed description of the methods by which we construct our data
set on currency exposures and a discussion of our key assumptions, the empirical model
that generates values where data are missing and the robustness of these estimates. We
turn in Section 4 to the construction of ﬁnancial exchange rate indices. Section 5 reports
the main results of our empirical analysis. Some conclusions are oﬀered in Section 6.
2 Conceptual Framework
Traditionally, the main focus of attention in analyzing the role of the exchange rate in the
international adjustment process has been its impact on real variables such as the trade
3balance and domestic and foreign levels of output and other macroeconomic variables.
However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence in interest in the balance sheet impact
of currency movements. While this valuation channel was recognized in the portfolio balance
literature that was developed during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the increase in the scale
of gross holding of foreign assets and liabilities means that its quantitative importance is
larger now than in previous decades.2
The recent literature has two main strands. One focuses on emerging market economies,
which are characterized by large stocks of foreign-currency debt. For these countries, cur-
rency depreciation has a negative valuation impact on the balance sheets of domestic enti-
ties, since the foreign-currency debt increases in value in terms of domestic currency. This
feature has led to a large policy and academic literature that investigates whether this chan-
nel is suﬃciently strong to alter optimal policy decisions, such as the choice of exchange
rate regime and the appropriate role for domestic interest rates during periods of ﬁnancial
turmoil.3
The other concentrates on the nature of the valuation channel for the major advanced
economies.4 In particular, this line of work highlights that these economies are typically
short in domestic currency and long in foreign currencies. That is, a substantial proportion
of foreign liabilities are denominated in domestic currency, while foreign currencies play a
large role in the composition of foreign assets. With this proﬁle, unanticipated depreciation
of the domestic currency boosts the net value of the international investment position, since
it raises the value of foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities.
At a general level, the role of the valuation channel in the dynamics of the external
position can be expressed using the following accounting framework. Following Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2005), the change in the net foreign asset position between periods t − 1
and t c a nb ew r i t t e na s
NFAt − NFAt−1 = CAt + VA L t (1)
where CAt is the current account surplus and VA L t is net capital gain on the existing
holdings of foreign assets and liabilities
2We focus on the valuation impact of currency movements; shifts in domestic and foreign asset prices
also inﬂuence the overall value of the international investment position.
3See, amongst others, the contributions to Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005), Devereux and Lane
(2003) and Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006).
4See, amongst others, Tille (2003, 2005), Gourinchas and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001,
2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b).








t are the ‘rates’ of capital gain on foreign assets and liabilities. This expres-
sion highlights that the importance of capital gains is increasing in the gross scale of the
international balance sheet - given values of kgA
t and kgL
t have a bigger impact on VA L t,
the larger are At−1 and Lt−1.
In turn, this implies that the valuation impact of a shift in a currency depends on its












where Et is the exchange rate. Accordingly, in order to make such calculations, it is neces-
sary to establish the currency composition of both sides of the international balance sheet.
While the literature cited above has emphasized the split between domestic- and foreign-
currency in the international balance sheet, very little is known in terms of the composition
of the foreign-currency element across the diﬀerent currencies. In particular, Tille (2003)
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) have emphasized that the ‘ﬁnance’ currency weights
for the United States are quite diﬀerent to the ‘trade’ currency weights, with European
currencies much more heavily represented in the former. Accordingly, we seek to gain a
more comprehensive understanding of the distribution of currency exposures for a large set
of countries.
To create these currency composition weights, we combine a number of data sets, aug-
mented by a fair amount of model-generated imputed data. The details of these procedures
are reported below. Before we address the details, we consider two broad concerns regard-
ing whether currency weights based on the currency denomination of foreign assets and
liabilities accurately represent the currency risk exposure a country faces.
First, local-currency asset prices could be negatively correlated with the exchange rate,
such that investor-currency returns might be insulated from currency movements. However,
there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that currency movements do matter for investor-
currency returns (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005). For instance, the failure of uncovered
interest parity and success of ﬁnancial trades such as the carry trade shows that returns do
not counter exchange rate movements in bond markets, but instead often reinforce them
(Burnside et al 2006). In relation to portfolio equity and FDI positions, a depreciation could
5be accompanied by an improvement in export performance, boosting the local-currency re-
turns on holdings in export-orientated ﬁrms and export-platform FDI. However, in the
other direction, a depreciation is also frequently accompanied by a slowing of the economy,
such that local-currency returns on domestically-orientated stocks and FDI positions are
negatively aﬀected. These conﬂicting forces may result in a weak average correlation be-
tween currency movements and local-currency returns on portfolio equity and FDI returns.
In related fashion, Pavlova and Rigobon (2006) show that the co-movement between asset
prices and exchange rates depends on the relative importance of productivity shocks versus
demand shocks: in their model, a positive productivity shock boosts the domestic stock
market and induces exchange rate depreciation, while a positive demand shock also boosts
equity returns but leads to exchange rate appreciation.
Furthermore, bank loans and deposits, reserves, and other assets or liabilities that are
not marked to market do not have price valuation eﬀects, only exchange rate based valuation
eﬀects, so there is no oﬀset for these asset classes. Thus, in total, while one would expect
exchange rate returns and local-currency asset returns to cancel one another out in some
ways, in practice there is considerable ‘pass through’ from exchange rate movements to
investor-currency returns.5 While there is some evidence that exchange rate and equity
returns negatively covary at high frequencies for industrial countries (Hau and Rey 2006),
there is no evidence of this correlation in annual data such that a depreciation of the foreign
currency reduces the home currency value of an equity investment in the foreign country
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005).
Second, if domestic agents hedge all currency exposure by buying insurance from foreign
agents, they will receive oﬀsetting gains on their derivative positions against any spot
exchange rate losses. Lack of data means that the extent of cross-border currency hedging
is diﬃcult to assess; while the volume of currency-related derivative trade is very large,
much of this is between domestic residents, which does not alter the aggregate net exposure
of the economy.67Hau and Rey (2006) estimate that only 10 percent of foreign equity
5In our empirical analysis, we investigate the comovement between the valuation eﬀects generated by
currency movements (VA L
XR) and the valuation eﬀects generated by shifts in asset prices (VA L
MV). Since
we residually calculate VA L
MV as the diﬀerence between the overall valuation eﬀect VA Land VA L
XR,i t
is not surprising that the two are negatively correlated, but we do ﬁnd that VA L
XR is positively correlated
with VA Land has a signiﬁcant impact on the direction of VA L , such that there is signiﬁcant ‘pass through’
from exchange rate movements to the net foreign asset position.
6However, see Becker and Fabbro (2006) for an extensive study of hedging in Australia that shows that
Australia is a net purchaser of currency insurance from foreign investors.
7In some cases, cross-border hedging can exacerbate overall exposures. In particular, suppose that
6positions are hedged, often due to institutional restrictions on the use of derivative contracts.
Furthermore, as noted above, if the counterparty in derivative contract is another domestic
resident, the currency risk still resides within the same country. In addition, any hedging
that comes through balancing of assets and liability exposure (e.g. simultaneously holding
dollar assets and liabilities) is captured in our weights: it is only the more complex derivative
contracts that will be missed. Finally, it is not clear that an optimizing agent would hedge
out all currency risk, depending on the correlation of particular currencies with the entire
portfolio of assets and liabilities and consumption growth in the investor’s country (see
Campbell et al 2006 for a discussion).8
3D a t a
We follow a two-step procedure in estimating currency positions. First, we determine
the currency composition of assets and liabilities within individual asset classes. Second,
we weight the asset classes by their shares in the international balance sheet in order to
construct the aggregate index.
The currency composition of assets and liabilities is calculated by combining informa-
tion from several international data sources. These include: the BIS international banking
statistics; the BIS international securities statistics; the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio In-
vestment Survey (CPIS); UNCTAD’s database on bilateral FDI positions; the World Bank’s
Global Development Finance database; data series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and national central
banks; and the ‘External Wealth of Nations’ dataset on foreign asset and liability positions
that has been developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007a). The method for deter-
mining currency composition of asset classes varies across asset classes, due to diﬀerences
in sources and data availability.
Since there are considerable data gaps for some countries, the construction of cur-
rency composition weights is not entirely mechanical — inference procedures are required to
interpolate some of the missing data. We then rely on recent advances in the modeling of
the geographical distribution of international ﬁnancial portfolios to generate predictions for
asset holdings that allow us to ﬁll in missing observations (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007d).
hedging is mostly carried out by holders of foreign-currency liabilities. For countries such as the United
States that are net long in foreign currencies, this form of hedging raises the aggregate net currency position.
8Even more generally, the optimal degree of currency hedging will also depend on the covariances between
currency movements and risk factors in production and trade.
7The appendix provides a detailed description of the methods employed to construct esti-
mates of the currency composition of international balance sheets.
Our full sample of countries includes 117 countries where we have full data. We eliminate
hyperinﬂation episodes due to their status as outliers, and start a country’s data after
the conclusion of a hyperinﬂation (countries with hyperinﬂations late in the sample are
dropped). Many results examine the change from 1994 to 2004. These results use a smaller
102 country sample that has full data from 1994 through 2004.
4 Index Creation
The dataset allows us to build a number of ‘ﬁnancially-weighted’ eﬀective exchange rate
indices for a large number of countries. For instance, the ‘bond-asset-weighted’ eﬀective
exchange rate index for a country would attach a 50 percent weight to the dollar, a 30
percent weight to the euro and a 20 percent weight to the yen if our procedure indicated
that the country’s foreign bond asset position had a 50-30-20 split between these currencies.
Similarly, the ‘bank-asset-weighted’ index would reﬂect the relative importance of diﬀerent
currencies in foreign deposits. While the same foreign currencies tend to be involved in
most weights, the crucial result from our work is to identify for each country the relative
shares of domestic and foreign currencies in foreign assets and liabilities and the relative
importance of diﬀerent international currencies in the foreign currency component of the
international balance sheet.
Once we have the currency composition data for each asset class within assets and
liabilities, we can combine these asset classes to create aggregate weights, using data from
the ‘External Wealth of Nations’ database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a).
This dataset reports the levels of foreign assets and liabilities for 145 countries over 1970-
2004, together with the composition of each side of the international balance sheet between
portfolio equity, direct investment, reserves and debt. This is important since two countries
could have similar currency exposures within individual asset classes but diﬀerent aggregate
exposures, due to diﬀerences in the relative importance of diﬀerent investment categories
across the two countries. Moreover, the structure of international balance sheets has been
shifting over time - even if currency exposures were stable for individual asset classes,
aggregate exposures could change due to this composition eﬀect.9 T h i sg i v e su st h ec u r r e n c y
composition weights for individual asset classes as well as a set of aggregate weights that
9See Faria et al (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) on the sources of changes in the external
capital structure of countries.
8would take into account diﬀerences in the relative importance of the diﬀerent investment
categories across countries and over time. We calculate an aggregate ﬁnance-weighted index
as well as asset- and liability-weighted indices.

















ijt are the weights for currency j in period t in country i’s assets- and liabilities-
exchange rate indices, λAk
it ,λ Lk
it are the relative importance of category k (portfolio equity,
FDI, debt, reserves) in country i’s assets and liabilities in period t and ωAk
ijt,ωLk
ijt are the
weights for currency j in period t in category k for country i’s assets and liabilities re-
spectively. Accordingly, the aggregate weights are a function of the weights for currency j
in period t for a particular k asset-class of country i’s assets or liabilities, and the weights
across the k asset classes (represented by λk
it). This allows us to derive the valuation impact






where A and L are deﬁned as the size of foreign assets and liabilities relative to GDP and
VA Lis deﬁned as the change in net foreign wealth (relative to GDP) caused by valuation
changes. More generally, we are interested in asset- and liability-weighted exchange rate
indices and the overall impact on net foreign wealth of these exchange rate changes.








it−1 = Ait−1/(Ait−1 + Lit−1) and sL
it−1 = Lit−1/(Ait−1 + Lit−1) are the shares of
foreign assets and foreign liabilities in total cross-border holdings. The weights generated
by equation (8) indicate the direction of the valuation impact of a movement in currency j.
I ft h en e tf o r e i g na s s e tp o s i t i o ni sz e r os u c ht h a t foreign assets and liabilities are perfectly
balanced, this reduces to simply subtracting the liability weights from the asset weights.
Conceptually, an index crafted with these weights will capture the directional eﬀect of a set
of bilateral exchange rate changes on the net external position.
9An exchange rate index based on weights from equation (8) is conceptually diﬀerent
from a trade-weighted index because it has currencies entering both positively and neg-
atively. Moreover, if net positions and currency compositions are balanced, there is no
movement in the index regardless of bilateral exchange rate movements. For this reason, to
enable comparisons to other indices, we also separately examine asset- and liability-weighted
indices.
The particular details of index creation also warrant some attention. Our index uses
the weights (trade or asset or liability) to average the percentage changes of the exchange
rate versus other currencies and this is multiplied by the index from the previous period.





















where Iit is the index for country i, wijt is the weight given to currency j in period t and
Eijt is the nominal exchange between i and j.
As with a trade-weighted index, however, we cannot assess the scale of the impact
without knowing the size of the gross foreign asset and liability positions. Accordingly,




ijt ∗ IFIit−1 (11)
where the valuation impact is increasing in the gross scale of the international balance sheet
(IFIit−1 = Ait−1 + Lit−1).
In turn, this means that the aggregate sensitivity of the net foreign asset position to
currency movements (as opposed to total valuation eﬀects) is given by
VA L XR
it =% ∆IA
it ∗ At−1 − %∆IL
it ∗ Lt−1 (12)
where the superscript XR indicates valuation changes from exchange rate movement.10 As
the absolute value of VA L XR
it goes up, the extent to which net foreign wealth is aﬀected by
the exchange rate increases.
Equation (12) is the equivalent of multiplying the percentage change in an index based
on weights from equation (8) times the sum of assets and liabilities. To see this, deﬁne the
10By deﬁnition, then, the total valuation eﬀect is the sum of the exchange rate valuation eﬀect and the
asset price valuation eﬀect.












I nt u r n ,t h i sa l l o w su st ow r i t e
VA L XR
it =% ∆IF
it ∗ IFIit−1 (14)
where IFIit−1 =( Ait−1+Lit−1). Equation (15) highlights that the magnitude of currency-
related valuation eﬀects depends on two factors: (i) the movement in the ﬁnancially-
weighted exchange rate index; and (ii) the gross scale of the international balance sheet.
IF
it can also be written in the same form as equations (11) and (12) using the aggregate net
ﬁnancial weights deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 9 ) .
Our index is a rough approximation of a geometric average that focuses on the percent-
age change versus each currency in a given time period as the relevant information, not the
level.11 It will also move similarly to a portfolio that uses these weights to deﬁne shares of
the portfolio.12
Often, when the impact of outliers is an issue, one might prefer a geometric weighted
average. However, that is not the appropriate speciﬁcation in this case. We deﬁne the
exchange rate in the standard manner, the home price of foreign currency, such that a
negative movement represents an appreciation of the home currency. This assumption
means that, if a trading partner experiences a major depreciation due to a hyperinﬂation
or some other crisis, that partner’s exchange rate in the index will decrease rapidly towards
zero — not explode towards inﬁnity. In this way, if the only change in the various bilateral
exchange rates were a collapse of a rate towards zero, our index will simply drop by the
amount of the weight. This is the equivalent of some portion of a portfolio becoming
worthless and thus ﬁts our needs well.
In contrast, a geometric index is strongly aﬀected by such an outlier heading close to
zero, even if the weight on it is relatively small. Due to the property of raising the value to
the power of the weight, any number that is very close to zero winds up having an unusually
large presence in reducing the index towards zero. That is, the index would drop down by
11Note that the log of a geometric average is the weight times log(E) for each currency and thus the
approximation of the percentage change of the geometric average would simply be the sum of the change
in log(E), or roughly the percentage change. The approxi m a t i o nb r e a k sd o w nw h e nt h e r ei sav e r yl a r g e
outlier (with a very large percentage change) in which case that outlier will take on a larger weight in our
index than in a pure geometric index.
12A pure geometric index will not move like a portfolio and thus could not be tracked by a portfolio
assembled using its weights.
11far more than the weight on the currency, suggesting that if we simply assumed that all
assets in a particular currency were now worthless, the index would drop by more than the
amount those assets were worth.13
Accordingly, we ﬁnd that to reduce the impact of outliers and have the index move in
a way that matches what the values of a portfolio of assets would do, deﬁning an exchange
rate such that an appreciation of the home currency is a negative movement and using the
summation index is the appropriate method.
In many settings, when calculating an index and changing the weights over time, one
must worry that a change in the weight with no change in the value of the item in question
will lead to a change in the index. One, in fact, would like this to happen as, for example,
if the weight on more expensive items goes up, this will lead to a cost of living increase:
one must chain weight the weights to appropriately smooth over time. In our case, we are
simply concerned with the change in the exchange rate index over time: if the exchange
rate for all countries were constant, and the weights change, we would want zero change in
the index. Our index method ensures that this would be the case, since the index combines
percentage changes in the exchange rate. Accordingly, more complex chain weighting is not
necessary; we can simply employ new weights whenever they are available.
Thus, in the end, our index tells us about the change in the exchange rate against a
set of partners weighted by information for that year. When a gap in years is present, we
average across to ﬁll in the missing weights. 1997 weights are extended back to 1990 for
asset classes that have their earliest data on currency composition in 1997 (equity and debt
asset).
5A n a l y s i s
The weights and indices described open a variety of avenues for analysis that were previously
unavailable due to a lack of data. Our analysis proceeds along three lines. First, we
examine the various indices described in Section 4. Next, we explore the variation in
aggregate foreign currency exposures across countries and over time. Finally, we look at
role played by ﬁnancial-weighted exchange rate indices in driving the valuation component
of the dynamics of net foreign asset positions.
13For example, if an exchange rate fell from 100 to 0.1 and it made up 10 percent of an index and there
were no other changes, the summation index would fall from 100 to 90, but the geometric index would fall
from 100 to 50. Again, note that if we had deﬁned the exchange rate such that the outlier were going from
100 to 10000, the geometric index would go from 100 to 158, but the summation would jump to over 1000.
125.1 Comparison of Exchange Rate Indices
Our ﬁrst task is to compare exchange rate indices across trade, asset, liability and net ﬁ-
nancial weights. A comparison of trade- and ﬁnance-weighted exchange rates demonstrates
the extent to which we need to know currency exposures in the international balance sheet
in order to understand the ﬁnancial impact of exchange rate changes. If a trade-weighted
exchange rate could easily summarize what is happening in our net index, the new index
would be far less important. Furthermore, by comparing asset- and liability-weighted in-
dices, we can better understand the extent to which countries have currency mis-matches
in their assets and liabilities.
5.1.1 Correlations
Table 1 provides the mean and median within-country correlation of the monthly percentage
changes in diﬀerent indices. The asset- and liability-indices show a high pairwise correlation.
In addition, both are individually correlated with the trade index, although the correlation
is a bit weaker for the liability index (largely reﬂecting the importance of domestic-currency
liabilities). A country tends to have similar ﬁnancial partners on both the asset and liability
side of the international balance sheet, or at least its currency moves in similar directions
against the two sets of partners.
However, Table 1 also shows a strongly negative average correlation between the net
ﬁnancial index and the trade-weighted index for the full sample and the developing sample.
This can be reconciled with the high pairwise correlation between the asset- and liability-
indices by understanding that it is the net positions and also the size of the movements of
assets- and liability indices that generate the diverging pattern for the net ﬁnancial index
from the trade index, rather than directly opposing moves of the asset- and liability indices.
This largely reﬂects the typical proﬁle of a country with a negative net foreign-currency
position: if it depreciates, its trade index and net ﬁnancial index move in opposite direc-
tions. Although the typical correlation between these indices is positive for the advanced
economies, the magnitude is much lower than for other pairs of indices.14
Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of this correlation. A cluster of countries
are correlated near minus 1: these countries typically had very large depreciations at some
14This table, and many others, breaks countries into advanced, emerging, and developing groups. The
advanced countries are the group typically known as industrialized countries (ifs code less than 199 except
Turkey). The emerging sample is the group of countries in the Morgan Stanley emerging market index with
some additional eastern European countries. The developing sample is all other countries.
13point during the sample period, while maintaining negative foreign-currency positions. Even
beyond this group, the correlation between the two indices is quite weak for a large range of
countries, since the diﬀerences between trade partners and ﬁnancial partners mean the two
indices simply move diﬀerently. For example, industrial countries (marked by their country
abbreviation), who on average have net positive foreign currency positions, have a mean of
0.41 and a median of 0.70. For comparison, we see that the pairwise correlation between
any other type of index (assets and trade, imports and exports, etc.) is above 0.85.T h u s ,
it appears the trade index does a poor job of summarizing the net ﬁnancial impact on a
country when the exchange rate changes.
5.1.2 Exchange Rate Volatility
Along another dimension, Table 2 shows the volatilities across indices. The liability index
is much more stable than the asset index, especially for industrial countries: the average
standard deviation of the percentage change of the liabilities index is only 3.5 percent for
industrial countries as opposed to 5.9 percent for the assets. This again reﬂects the greater
share of the domestic currency in liability indices. The leader in this regard is the United
States, where over 90 percent of liabilities are in dollars and as a result the liability index
has a volatility of less than 1 percent a year.
Since the liability index is so much more stable than the asset index, even if the two
move directionally together and are highly correlated, the amplitude of the asset index is
greater. In turn, this implies that currency movements may generate valuation eﬀects, even
for countries with zero net foreign asset positions. Table 2 also shows that net ﬁnancial
indices are far more stable than any other index for all types of countries. This again
represents that net valuation impact of currency movements is limited by the oﬀsetting
eﬀects on the value of foreign-currency assets and foreign-currency liabilities. However,
especially for developing countries, there is a fair degree of volatility in this index. 15
Panel B of Table 2 shows that in either sudden stops or cases where a country depreciates
50 percent or more against its base, the net index is both strikingly more stable and moves
in an opposite direction of the trade index. Despite the relative stability, a negative 8
percent move of the net index (for sudden stops) can generate large valuation losses and
the negative 30 percent move for the large depreciation countries suggests large losses. In
fact, the sudden stop countries lost 6 percent of GDP on average and the large depreciation
15The pattern is the same if one instead examines the average absolute value of the percentage change of
the index instead of the standard deviation of the changes.
14countries 29 percent of GDP.16
5.1.3 Co-Movement of Asset- and Liability-Weighted Indices
An alternative way of considering the movements of asset and liability-weighted indices is
to regress the change in the liability index on the change in the asset index
%∆IL
it = α + β ∗ %∆IA
it + εit (15)
This allows us to consider both the direction of the changes and the magnitudes. If β =1 ,
it suggests that its currency exposure is well matched in assets and liabilities: a country
still may be exposed to valuation changes if it has a positive or negative net foreign asset
position, but the problem will not be currency mismatches.
Table 3 shows that the estimated ˆ β =0 .80 for the full sample and the developing group,
with a very high R2 in each case. For the advanced country group, ˆ β =0 .66 and the R2
is marginally lower. Again, this diﬀerence is intuitive in view of the greater reliance of
developing countries on foreign-currency liabilities. Since ˆ β<1 in all cases, a generalized
movement in the value of the home currency against other currencies will induce a shift
in the value of the net foreign asset position, even for a country with an initially-balanced
international investment position.
5.1.4 Case Studies
We conclude our examination of exchange rate indices by looking at a selection of six
countries in Figures 2a-f. In the US case, the indices for assets and liabilities are quite
diﬀerent due to the stability of the liability index. While the net ﬁnancial index is correlated
with the trade-weighted index, the relative magnitude of changes vary from year to year.
In the last few years, the asset index has moved more dramatically than the trade index.
The net remains more stable due to the oﬀ-setting eﬀects from liabilities.
In contrast, for France, we see the liabilities index move more similarly to the asset
index, so the net index is ﬂat regardless of ﬂuctuations in the trade index. Also, all the
indices are relatively stable, reﬂecting the role ﬁrst of the EMS and then EMU in limiting
multilateral volatility for France.
16These calculations are based on 17 sudden stops that are not classiﬁed as hyperinﬂations and 52 large
depreciations (where the year average exchange rate depreciates against the base by at least 50 percent)
that are not hyperinﬂations. The sudden stop episodes are those listed by Durdu et al (2007).
15The patterns for Brazil are representative of the typical emerging market economy. The
exchange rate depreciates for trade, asset, and liability weighting, but the net index moves
in the opposite direction (a depreciation worsens the net index for indebted countries).
Since 2002, we see that Brazil has appreciated against both trade and ﬁnance partners
and this has led to valuation gains. China’s asset, liability, and net indices are virtually
ﬂat due to the peg against the dollar and the outsized weight of the dollar in all ﬁnance
indices for China. Alternatively, the trade index for China moves with the dollar versus
other non-dollar trade partners (although in the last year, the Chinese depreciation has
been smaller than the US due to the small RMB appreciation against the dollar).
Benin shows a country where trade weights and asset and liability weights are quite
diﬀerent with a slowly appreciating trade index moving in an unlinked fashion from the
indices for assets and liabilities. The net and trade indices are nearly mirrors. Finally, in
Bangladesh, like Brazil, the net index falls as the currency depreciates on a trade, asset,
and liability basis, although in ﬁnal years, the liability index is ﬂattening relative to the
asset index as more liabilities are denominated in domestic currency.
Comparing the emerging and developing countries can highlight the role of the exchange
rate regime. China has pegged to its main ﬁnancial partner and thus eﬀectively stabilized
its asset, liability, and net indices, but not its trade index. Alternatively, Benin (a member
of the CFA) has relatively stable trade index due to a stable exchange rate against both
local countries and the euro. Its ﬁnancial indices, though, move considerably as the US
dollar plays a large role in these (despite almost no role in trade). The large net negative
position against the world (and in particular the dollar) means that as the euro and dollar
move back and forth, Benin’s net index does as well. Finally, as it has not maintained a
tight peg in this era, Brazil sees much more volatility in all these indices.
In summary, we see a diverse range of patterns, with the trade index relatively uninfor-
mative about the ﬁnancial impact of currency movements. We now turn to one of the key
drivers of the net ﬁnancial index: the net foreign currency exposure.
5.2 Net Foreign-Currency Exposures
There has been a ﬂurry of recent work that seeks to calculate optimal international portfo-
lios within the framework of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic models
(Engel and Matsumoto 2005, Devereux and Saito 2006, Devereux and Sutherland 2006a,
2006b, 2006c, Kollmann 2006, Benigno 2006, Tille and van Wincoop 2007). One question
addressed by this literature is the optimal pattern in nominal exchange rate exposures, with
16the answer depending on the conﬁguration of shocks hitting the economy and the range
of assets that are internationally traded. Although results are typically dependent on the
precise speciﬁcation of the model, the general pattern is that a positive domestic produc-
tivity shock raises domestic welfare and induces exchange rate depreciation. Accordingly, a
good hedge is to hold a negative position in foreign-currency assets. In contrast, a positive
domestic demand shock raises domestic welfare but induces exchange rate appreciation. In
this case, the hedging portfolio involves a positive position in foreign-currency assets.
Another strand in this literature has highlighted that structural diﬀerences across economies
can help explain the conﬁguration of international portfolios. For instance, Mendoza et al
(2007) show a model in which diﬀerences in the degree of ﬁnancial development mean that
the advanced economy becomes a net debtor but holds a long equity position in the devel-
oping economy. (See Caballero et al 2006 for a related model and Devereux and Sutherland
2007 for a related result.)
In order to inform this literature at an empirical level, we can look at the net weight on
the rest of the world to see if countries have taken positive or negative aggregate foreign-
currency positions.17
5.2.1 The Cross-Sectional Distribution of Foreign-Currency Exposures
For this purpose, it is useful to work with the concept of aggregate foreign currency expo-








it is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, sA
it is the share
of foreign assets in the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities and ωL
it,s L
it are deﬁned
analogously. Aggregate foreign currency exposure captures the sensitivity of a country to a
uniform currency movement by which the home currency moves proportionally against all
foreign currencies. In turn, the net impact on the external balance sheet is given by
NETFXit = FXAGG
it ∗ IFIit−1 (17)
Figure 3 and Table 4 show the cross-sectional distribution of FXAGG in 1994. We
see that a majority (70 percent) have a net negative position in foreign currencies with
an average weight of -27 percent. Over 20 percent have below -50 percent weight, leaving
17In principle, multi-country versions of these models could deliver predictions about net holdings of
diﬀerent currencies. To our knowledge, these models have not yet been developed in the literature.
17them with a considerable short position in foreign currencies. On the other hand, industrial
countries are on average close to balance (mean and median weight are between zero and
10 percent) and 60 percent of industrial countries have a positive net weight in foreign
currencies. Emerging countries are on balance negative, but much closer to zero than the
poorer developing countries.
Figure 3 also shows the same distribution but for the year 2004. By 2004, 17 percent
more of the sample had taken a positive position against the rest of the world. The mean
and median position have both moved close to zero (-7 percent) and only roughly 10 percent
have positions of -50 percent or worse. The industrial countries still have means and medians
close to positive 10 percent with 86 percent of them having net positive exposure. Emerging
countries are also on average positive by 2004. It should be noted that shifting to a positive
net position does not eliminate exchange rate based valuation eﬀects: it simply means that
the sign will be positive when the country depreciates against the rest of the world.
To put these ﬁgures in context, a negative foreign-currency exposure of 50 percent
against the rest of the world means that a 10 percent depreciation would generate a valuation
loss of 10 percent times 50 percent times total assets and liabilities divided by GDP (recall
that equation (15) shows the valuation gain is the percentage change in the index times
the gross scale of international ﬁnancial integration). Thus, a country at the average gross
position of 200 percent of GDP would experience a 10 percent of GDP loss from such a
depreciation. These wealth eﬀects are considerable and demonstrate why the aggregate
foreign-currency position against the rest of the world is an important indicator.18
The bottom half of Table 4 shows the values of NETFXit in 1994 and 2004. This helps
to demonstrate the scale at which a change in the exchange rate would aﬀect the economy.
The changes from 1994 to 2004 show a similar pattern to the raw FXAGG
it statistics in the
top half of the table with the exception that the industrial countries positions has improved
even more by this measure. While many industrial countries have not shifted FXAGG
it
18We also note that there can still be considerable exchange rate shocks due to bilateral movements even
if FX
AGG
it is zero. All but 10 countries are short some other currency in 2004 and 50 percent have a negative
weight of 11 percent or more against some other currency. The largest net negative position varies, with half
short the dollar and the others roughly evenly split between the euro and yen. All but one country are long
another currency, though the average position is smaller (7 percent weight). The long positions are spread
across the dollar (33 percent), the pound (20), and the euro (28) along with 16 other currencies which are
the largest long position for somewhere between 1 and 3 other countries. The more minor currencies become
important due to a large FDI holding in the country and no oﬀ-setting liabilities in that currency. Thus,
even countries with roughly balanced net positions tend to have considerable exposure to movements across
bilateral rates.
18dramatically, their scale of ﬁnancial globalization (IFI) has increased considerably, so their
overall net long exposure against foreign currencies has increased as a share of the economy.
Again, they do not risk negative wealth eﬀects following depreciation, but they are exposed
to exchange rate movements.
5.2.2 The Dynamics of Currency Exposures
Next, we provide a decomposition of the shifts in currency exposures over the 1994-2004
period. The shift in foreign-currency exposure between periods t − N and t can come
either from increasing the share of assets relative to liabilities in IFI (sA
it), or reducing the
foreign currency weight of liabilities (ωL
ijt). Table 5 shows the driving factors underlying the
changes in FXAGG
it . There is a considerable range of behavior of FXAGG
it over the decade.
First, to understand why countries’ positions have changed we can divide the sample into
quartiles by the extent that FXAGG
it has changed (Panel A of Table 5). While the lowest
quartile sees a small decline in FXAGG
it , the top quartile has a range of 34-92 percentage
point increase in the index.
We see that all parts of the decomposition are important in explaining the shift in
positions. The top quartile saw a large positive shift in net foreign asset positions (the
asset share of gross assets and liabilities has increased strongly, 16 percentage points), as
opposed to a decrease for the low quartile. In addition, the top quartile drastically reduced
the foreign currency share of their liabilities (29 percentage points) without a shift in the
share of assets. The bottom quartile showed a considerable drop in the share of both assets
and liabilities.
The drop in assets simultaneously with liabilities is largely an EMU phenomenon (28
percent of the countries in the bottom quartile where this behavior is strongest are in the
euro area). We can see this better by examining the decomposition across country types in
the bottom part of Table 5. EMU countries drastically increased the importance of domestic
currency on both sides of the international balance sheet, with the foreign-currency shares
of assets and liabilities decreasing by 52 and 42 percentage points respectively. Combined
with an essentially average NFA position, we see why EMU countries did not see much
improvement in their aggregate foreign currency exposure.19
19The crucial diﬀerence within the EMU countries seems to be the share of foreign currency liabilities
at the start. They all reduce their foreign currency liabilities weight to 10-20 percent. Countries such
as Finland that were near 90 percent to start, therefore see much bigger changes in the foreign currency
liabilities. Also, countries that started with more liabilities tend to see better improvement because even if
they reduced the foreign currency share of assets and liabilities simultaneously, the impact of the liabilities
19Non-EMU industrial and developing countries saw much bigger improvements in aggre-
gate exposures. In both groups, the average net foreign asset positions improved (on average
sA
it went up), and in particular for the developing countries, the foreign currency share of
liabilities has fallen sharply. Only the EMU countries have experienced a substantial shift
in the foreign currency components of assets.
Table 6 shows more details of the sources of the change in the foreign-currency exposure.
We focus on why the share of assets in the international ﬁnancial integration index rose
and why the foreign currency share of liabilities fell. FDI and equity are denominated
in local currency, so increasing their share of liabilities will lower the foreign currency
component of liabilities. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the top two quartiles (the ones that
improved FXAGG
it the most) saw substantial shifts towards equity oriented ﬁnancing, while
Panel B demonstrates that this shift is found most strongly in the emerging and developing
countries. On the other hand, there is eﬀectively no change in the foreign-currency share
of debt liabilities beyond the EMU countries, and these changes are trivial for the top two
quartiles.
As for the improved net foreign asset position of many countries, we examine whether
this is purely a result of increases in the accumulation of reserves. We see that all quartiles
increased the reserves share of total assets. For the top quartile, over 50 percent of the
increase in total assets came from an increase in reserves, while only the top quartile saw
a substantial increase in the non-reserve net foreign asset position. Across country groups,
we see that only the non-advanced countries were truly stockpiling reserves and that, for
emerging countries, it was this behavior that drove the shift in sA
it as the non-reserve net
external position was actually negative on average. Thus, the shift away from negative
foreign currency positions is not coming from borrowing in domestic currency but from the
shift towards equity ﬁnance and improvements in the net foreign asset position.
As was shown in equation (17), the net balance sheet impact of a uniform movement of
the home currencies against all foreign currencies is given by the product of FXAGG and
IFI (the scale of gross holdings of foreign assets and liabilities). Accordingly, the change








Table 7 shows the driving forces behind this decomposition. Table 7 shows that the gross
is bigger.
20scale of international ﬁnancial integration has been increasing across all quartiles, which is
reinforced by an increase in foreign-currency exposure for the top three quartiles. However,
the bottom quartile experiences an average decline in NETFXit, since the latter eﬀect
dominates the former for this group.
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows the decomposition by country group. All groups saw
an average increase in the importance of foreign-currency exposure over this period. How-
ever, the diﬀerence in composition across groups is striking. First, we see that NETFXit
increased for the EMU group, despite the mean fall in FXAGG
it : the growth in gross cross-
border holdings was suﬃciently large to dominate the declining share of foreign currencies
in these positions. While the non-EMU group of advanced economies and the developing
country group had broadly similar increases in NETFXit, this was driven by the growth
in gross international ﬁnancial integration for the former group whereas the compositional
shift towards a most positive foreign-currency balance was relatively more important for
the latter group. Non-emerging developing countries actually pulled back from the global ﬁ-
nancial economy with a shrinking IFI on average, but again, their rapidly improving FX
agg
it
m e a n tt h a tt h e ys t i l ls a wNETFXit go up. 20
Finally, Figure 4 shows the FX
agg
it and IFIit indices in 1994 and 2004 for all countries.
We see that large negative exposures (large negative FX
agg
it and large IFIit)w e r em u c h
more prevalent in 1994 than in 2004: countries have pulled back by reducing net external
liabilities and net foreign currency exposures. Another noteworthy shift is that there are
now a number of countries that combina a high degree of international ﬁnancial integration
with positive aggregate foreign-currency exposures. If these countries appreciate against
the currencies in which they are long, they will suﬀer large losses.
5.2.3 Determinants of Net Foreign-Currency Exposures
The variation in net foreign-currency exposures begs the question of whether the cross-
sectional dispersion in foreign-currency exposures can be related to country characteristics.
We consider an exploratory speciﬁcation
20We also studied the co-variation between FX
agg
it and IFIit by running cross-country regressions of
FX
agg
it and IFIit in levels and diﬀerences. For the all-country and developing-country samples, the bilateral
co-variation between the variables was not signiﬁcant in 1994 but was signiﬁcantly positive in 2004. In
contrast, the bilateral co-variation within the advanced-country group was signiﬁcantly positive in 1994 but
was not signiﬁcant in 2004 (but marginally negative, if an EMU dummy is included). For each sample, the
change in FX
agg
it and the change in IFIit between 1994 and 2004 were signiﬁcantly negatively correlated.
21FXAGG
it = α + β ∗ Zit + εit (19)
where the set of covariates Zit includes GDP per capita, trade openness, an institutional
quality indicator, country size and an EMU dummy.21
Table 8 shows the results for all-country, advanced and developing country samples
for 2004. Across all samples, there is clear positive relation between GDP per capita and
FXAGG
it : richer countries have more positive net foreign currency positions. For the all-
country sample, we also note that larger countries and countries with higher trade volumes
also have more positive positions: the positive covariation between country size and foreign
currency positions also holds in explaining variation within the developing-country group.
These results can be explained through the ability of larger and more open developing
countries to issue domestic-currency liabilities via portfolio equity and FDI channels (see
also Faria et al 2007).
5.3 The Valuation Channel
We investigate the quantitative importance of our ‘currency valuation’ term by running the
regression
VA L it = αit + β ∗ VA L XR
it + εit (20)
where VA L it is the aggregate valuation term deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 )a n dVA L XR
it is the
currency valuation term deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 4 ) ,w i t hb o t hs c a l e db yG D P .
If movements in the net ﬁnancial exchange rate index (interacted with the gross scale
of international ﬁnancial integration) were fully oﬀset by shifts in local-currency returns,
then we would expect β =0 . In contrast, a non-zero value of β indicates that exchange rate
movements exert a valuation impact, whether directly or indirectly (through simultaneous
movements in local-currency returns).22
The results displayed in Table 9 show an important role for the currency valuation
term in explaining that the overall valuation eﬀect. For developing or emerging countries,
the ‘pass through’ is approximately one-to-one: a currency gain of 1 percentage point of
21Although we lack strong theoretical guidance in formulating this speciﬁcation, this list of regressors has
been employed to consider other dimensions of external capital structure (see, for example, Faria et al 2007).
22A complication relates to valuation shocks that cannot be directly tied either to exchange rates or
market price movements. These may include data revisions, debt reduction schemes and capital transfers. In
addition to introducing a degree of noise, there may also be some correlation between currency depreciations
and debt reduction schemes.
22GDP (according to our measure) is associated with a 1 percentage point aggregate net
capital gain. Moreover, the regression has considerable explanatory power for these groups
of countries (between 0.4 and 0.6).
The pattern is quite diﬀerent for the advanced countries. While the currency valuation
term is signiﬁcant, the explanatory power of the regression is much lower at 0.06−.09.T h e
estimated ˆ β is also much lower at roughly 0.6, which suggests that there is some degree of
oﬀset by which capital gains via currency movements are partially cancelled out by lower
foreign-currency returns. The diﬀerences between the advanced and other country groups
are quite intuitive: the larger equity positions of the former group mean that price valuation
shocks play a more important role.23
These currency-induced wealth eﬀects are not trivial in size. Table 10 shows that the
75th percentile of absolute movements in VA L XR
it is 2.8 percent of GDP for advanced
countries, 3.8 percent for emerging countries, and 5.3 percent for developing countries,
meaning that one in four observations has a shock of these magnitudes. These eﬀects are
sizable enough to dominate current account ﬂows in some years and, depending on the
market capitalization of a country, may rival the wealth eﬀects of stock market booms and
busts.24 In addition, since these are transfers across borders, these may matter more for
the international transmissio mechanism than price shifts that cause large transfers across
agents within an economy.
Quite importantly, these wealth shocks are not just paper gains and losses that reverse
with quick exchange rate reversals. In regressions of VAL on lagged VAL, we ﬁnd that
all three types of valuation eﬀects are essentially stationary. They all have autocorrelation
coeﬃcients of nearly zero. Individual country coeﬃcients are quite noisy, but only a handful
have point estimates lower than -0.2 (suggesting some reversals) for the exchange rate
valuation shocks. Thus, the wealth gains or losses from VA L XR appear to be sizable and
persistent, opening the possibility that they have a real impact on the economy.
5.4 An Example: A Dollar Crash
We conclude our analysis with an example that demonstrates the diﬀerences across trade
indices, ﬁnance indices, and valuation eﬀects by examining what would happen if the US
23The regressions are similar with or without ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered by country.
24World stock market capitalization was roughly 100 percent of world GDP in 2005 (Reuters, 2007). Across
major countries, capitalizations range from 50 to 200 percent of GDP meaning a change of 10 percent in
the stock market would generate wealth shocks in the range of 5 to 20 percent of GDP.
23dollar depreciated by 20 percent across all currencies.25 Table 11 shows interesting divisions
across country groups. While all countries face trade-weighted appreciations, emerging
markets see the largest shift due to their tight relationship with the US on a trade basis. In
contrast, it is non-EMU advanced countries that face the largest net ﬁnancial index change,
a greater than 1 percent change in the index and almost 5 percent of GDP loss from
valuation. Non-emerging developing countries in fact beneﬁt from a dollar depreciation
on average. They have suﬃciently large negative positions in the dollar that a dollar
depreciation lifts their net index and in fact provides net ﬁnancial gains on the order of
3 percent of GDP. Whether this suﬃciently oﬀsets the eﬀects of an appreciating trade-
weighted exchange rate is unclear, but it certainly dampens the eﬀect when compared to
emerging market countries that lose on both trade and ﬁnancial dimensions.
5.5 Discussion
The analysis has several implications for the design of ‘new portfolio balance’ models.
First, our ﬁndings highlight the importance of modelling the dual role of exchange rates
in the international adjustment process: with the ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rate index
operating through the valuation channel, and the trade-weighted index inﬂuencing net
exports. As we have highlighted, the potential importance of the valuation channel is
secularly increasing, in line with the rapid growth in the gross levels of foreign assets and
liabilities.
Second, the interaction between external wealth eﬀects and domestic sectoral balance
sheets may be important for domestic macroeconomic performance, since the net worth
of banks, ﬁrms, households and the government may be aﬀected by currency-induced
valuation shifts. In this regard, it may be useful to establish the conditions under which
such valuation movements may have a stabilising inﬂuence versus scenarios under which
the impact is pro-cyclical.
Third, an understanding of the ﬁnancial implications of currency movements is impor-
tant for the optimal design of monetary and ﬁscal policies for open economies; moreover, the
optimal policy regime plausibly depends on structural characteristics, such as the degree of
ﬁnancial development and the contracting environment in a given economy. Finally, all of
25Warnock (2006) examines the losses other countries would face on US held assets under a set of shocks
to US equity and bond prices as well as the US dollar. Our experiment only focuses on the currency, but
importantly includes both the assets and liabilities of countries such that some countries can in fact come
out ahead if there is a dollar depreciation (if they have suﬃcient dollar liabilities). See also Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) for a study of the impact of a dollar shift on individual European countries.
24these dimensions feed into optimal international portfolio decisions. In view of the poten-
tial complexity of such models, it is important to be guided by the empirical regularities in
model design and selection.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Our goal in this paper has been to understand the international ﬁnancial implications of
currency movements. To this end, we have drawn from a wide range of sources to build
a large-scale data set of international currency positions, constructed ﬁnancially-weighted
exchange rate indices and calculated net foreign-currency exposures.
Our analysis shows that trade-weighted exchange rate indices are an inadequate guide
in understanding the wealth eﬀects of currency movements. In addition, we ﬁnd that many
developing countries have historically had a negative net position in foreign currencies,
such that depreciations of the domestic currency have generated negative wealth eﬀects.
However, we have found that many of these countries have shifted towards a less exposed
currency position over the last decade, largely through improvements in their net foreign
asset position and an increase in the share of foreign liabilities that are in asset classes
denominated in local currency (such as equity and FDI). In addition, many countries, but
in particular advanced countries, have increased their international positions so much that
even with relatively balanced net positions, they still may see substantial wealth shocks
from currency movements.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the wealth eﬀects associated with exchange rate changes are sub-
stantial, unlikely to reverse quickly, and can explain a sizable share of the overall valuation
shocks that hit the net foreign asset position, especially for developing countries. We view
these results as providing an important guide for the appropriate design of the next gener-
ation of ‘new portfolio balance’ models of the open economy.
25Appendix
A Estimating Currency Positions: Methods
As noted in section 3, we follow a two-step procedure in estimating currency positions.
First, we determine the currency composition of assets and liabilities within individual
asset classes. Second, we weight the asset classes by their shares in the country’s portfolio
in order to construct the aggregate index. This appendix provides a detailed description of
how we construct the estimated currency positions.
A.1 Foreign Assets
The asset side of a country’s international balance sheet is divided into ﬁve classes: portfolio
equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, other debt (generally bank-related), and reserves.
Each requires its own sources and unique methodology and these methods are described
below.
A.1.1 Portfolio Equity
The CPIS data set provides the geographical location of equity asset holdings by country
for 68 reporter countries across 220 host countries. In order to provide estimates for country
pairs that are missing from the data set, we employ a gravity-based model of bilateral equity
holdings to construct estimated positions in these cases.26
Our approach relies on two key assumptions. First, we assume that equity issued by
country is denominated in the currency of country. That is, US stocks are denominated in
dollars, Japanese stocks in yen and so on. While there is no automatic relation between
equity returns and currency movements, it is reasonable to assume that currency-related
equity exposures are correlated with the geographical pattern in portfolio and direct invest-
ment equity holdings. In particular, especially for smaller source countries, the domestic-
currency spot value of a foreign equity should move one for one with the relevant bilateral
exchange rate if the foreign-currency equity value moves orthogonally to the bilateral ex-
change rate.27 (See also the discussion in section 2 regarding the lack of correlation between
26See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d), Portes and Rey (2005) and Martin and Rey (2004) for theoretical
and empirical support for such a procedure. We do not rely on trade ﬂows, but instead are essentially
creating an asset allocation model where host GDP proxies for investment opportunities, and distance and
other gravity variables proxy for information costs.
27This also applies if foreign equity is held in the form of an American or global depository receipt . (In
26returns and exchange rate changes).
Second, following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d), we eliminate holdings listed in oﬀ-
shore ﬁnancial centers. Countries report very large holdings in these oﬀshore centers (such
as Luxembourg) but these holdings really represent claims on assets in other ﬁnal desti-
nations. By excluding these holdings, we implicitly assume that the holdings in oﬀshore
centers eventually wind up in the same pattern as those that go directly to other countries.
After eliminating oﬀshore centers, we are left with 50 reporting countries and 180 hosts.28
In order to generate estimated positions for those country pairs that are missing from
the CPIS dataset, we employ a modiﬁed-form of the speciﬁc a t i o nd e v e l o p e db yL a n ea n d
Milesi-Ferretti (2007d) by running a bilateral equity holding regression of the form
log(1 + EQijt)=φj + θt + βZijt + γXit + εijt (A.1)
where φj r e p r e s e n th o s tc o u n t r yﬁxed eﬀects, θt year ﬁxed eﬀects and Zijt is a vector of
bilateral variables - distance, longitude gap (to proxy for time zone diﬀerences), common
language dummies, colonial relationship dummies, and measures of relative GDP such as
a dummy for both countries being industrial, the gap in GDP per capita and the gap in
GDP.
We do not include source country ﬁxed eﬀects, since our goal is to estimate missing
source country data, but we can include a number of source country characteristics in Xit
such as latitude, landlocked status, population, capital controls, and GDP per capita.29
Such time invariant (or nearly time invariant) data cannot be included for the host country
as the host country ﬁxed eﬀect already controls for all host characteristics.30 This regres-
sion has considerable explanatory power (R2 values in the region of 0.79), high enough to
generate sensible predicted values, and the coeﬃcients on the independent variables take
measuring the international investment position, the domestic versus foreign status of an asset depends on
the residence of the issuer, not on the location of the transaction.) Consider a US investor holding stock
in a Chilean ﬁrm through an ADR listed in New York. Since these stocks are listed primarily in Chile, the
dollar price in New York automatically moves with the peso-dollar exchange rate and the peso value of the
stock in Chile.
28We follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d) and primarily use the IMF Background Paper, “Oﬀshore
Financial Centers” (2000), as our guide to labelling countries as oﬀshore centers.
29Geography and other gravity model controls come from the CEPII geography database. GDP data is
from the World Bank WDI database.
30While Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d) show that the level of trade is a predictor for equity positions,
once a suﬃcient number of gravity controls are included, we ﬁnd that despite trade receiving a signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient, the R
2 on the overall regression does not move much when including trade. Since there are many
missing observations for the trade data, we do not include it.
27expected signs and magnitudes.31
We then use these predicted values for the missing observations, along with the actual
data, to generate currency composition of equity holdings. For non-reporter countries, we
are using synthetic data for their weights. As it turns out, these do not play as dramatic role
as one might fear in our overall index creation, since countries that are not CPIS reporters
typically hold fairly small equity portfolios. In fact, the External Wealth of Nations data
compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) show that half of the non-reporters have no
equity assets and non-reporters only have an average of 2 to 3 percent of their foreign assets
in equity. For this reason, in an overall index, our derived currency composition of their
equity assets plays a small role.
A.1.2 Direct Investment
We use the UNCTAD database on stocks of bilateral direct investment assets and liabilities.
These data give us both outward and inward stocks of direct investment for 73 reporting
countries vis-a-vis up to 196 partner countries. Since we have both inward and outward data,
we can infer the bilateral direct investment assets of many non-reporting countries from
the bilateral direct investment liabilities of the reporters. Since most major destinations
are reporters, this process gives us a reasonable gauge of the currency distribution of the
non-reporter countries.
The data are available over 1970-2004, although there are many missing observations.
The direct investment stocks are valued at book value or historical cost. While it may
be preferable to measure direct investment stocks at market value, this limitation has
only limited relevance in establishing the weights for an FDI exchange rate index, since
the geographical composition of the stock is the key factor. Since we have both inward
and outward data, we can use this to establish bilateral patterns for a large number of
countries.32
We follow our process for portfolio equity and assume that all direct investment is ef-
fectively denominated in the currency of the host country. This is plausible to the extent
that direct investment assets have a location-speciﬁc component (e.g. structures or in-
stalled equipment) and/or proﬁts are largely generated in the host country. However, it is
31Details of these results are available from the authors upon request.
32For a small number of countries we rely on ﬂow data to create a general pattern because the stock data
is too incomplete. Also, for a handful of countries where FDI is not signiﬁcant (less than 1 percent of total
assets and less than 40 million dollars) and the data appear incomplete, we drop FDI from total assets and
rescale remaining assets.
28more problematic in the case of export-platform FDI: while domestic costs still matter for
proﬁtability and the value of the FDI position, it also depends on revenues generated in
ﬁnal customer markets. In addition, the FDI data include both equity and intra-company
loans, with the latter plausibly more likely to be denominated in the currency of the source
country. While we bear these caveats in mind, we proceed with the assumption that the
value of direct investment positions are denominated in the currency of the host country.
A.1.3 Portfolio Debt
In some cases, as is detailed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c), countries report the
currency composition of their foreign portfolio debt asset portfolios. This information is
reported for the United States in the Report on the US Portfolio Holdings of Foreign
Securities published by the US Treasury, while the Bank of Japan has released the currency
composition of Japanese portfolio debt assets at the end of 2005 in its Portfolio Investment
Position Report.
However, for most countries, we do not have direct information on the currency com-
position of foreign portfolio debt assets. Accordingly, we adopt a multi-step inference
procedure. As in the case of portfolio equity, the CPIS dataset provides information on
the geographical patterns in bilateral portfolio bond holdings. We again employ a gravity
model to ﬁll out the geographical information for missing country pairs (where we have the
same number of countries and use the same data as in the equity regressions). For these
regressions, the R2 is approximately 0.77 and again the signs on the coeﬃcients on the
independent variables are sensible.
However, since many countries issue foreign-currency debt, estimating the currency com-
position of foreign debt assets requires additional steps. We begin with the international
securities dataset maintained by the BIS. 33 This dataset contains information on the cur-
rency denomination of international bonds for 113 issuing countries.34 For some countries
(such as the United States), international bonds are issued mainly in domestic currency.
For other countries, international bonds are typically denominated in foreign currency, with
33The construction of this dataset is described in BIS (2003).
34Where the BIS data set lacks data on the currency of issue for a country, we rely on the World Bank’s
GFD database of the currency composition of external debt. This is an imperfect measure because it includes
non portfolio long term debt (such as bank loans), but the countries which are missing BIS data make up a
small fraction of internationally held debt assets. Our dataset focuses on international bond issues - while
foreign investors have become active in the domestic bonds markets of developing countries in very recent
years, the international bond issues are more important for the vast bulk of our sample period.
29the relative importance of the major international ﬁnancial currencies (dollar, euro, yen,
Swiss franc, Sterling) varying across countries and over time.
In order to estimate the currency composition of portfolio debt assets, a na ïve approach
would be to simply assume that if a country holds an amount issued by country A, then the
currency composition of those holdings reﬂects the aggregate currency composition of the
international debt issued by country A. However, this would be misleading, since investors
from countries whose currencies are popular choices for foreign-currency bond issues are
apt to disproportionately hold their own currencies when purchasing international debt
securities issued by other countries (a tendency seen in the data used below from the US
T r e a s u r y ,B a n ko fJ a p a n ,a n dE C B ) .
In order to allow for this currency bias, we follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) in
exploiting the data provided by the United States Treasury, the European Central Bank
and the Bank of Japan regarding the currency composition of the foreign assets of these
regions. The United States reports the currency denomination of its portfolio debt assets in
each destination country (US Treasury 2004). From the Bank of Japan data, it is clear that
Japanese investors purchase (virtually) all of the yen-denominated debt issued by other
countries, while the European Central Bank data suggests that investors from the euro
area hold 66 percent of the euro-denominated debt issued by other countries (European
Central Bank 2005).35 Accordingly, we adjust the currency weights derived from the BIS
data to take into account the portfolio choices by the investors from the major currency
blocs and employ these adjusted weights in working out the currency composition of the
foreign holdings of investors from other countries.36
In particular, our re-weighting procedure is as follows. For each issuing country, the US
Treasury reports the currency composition of portfolio debt holdings in each country, so we
are able to directly subtract the exact US holdings from BIS issuance data to generate new
“rest of the world” totals for the currency composition of the international bonds issued
by each country that are not held by US investors. Since the information from the Bank
of Japan shows that Japanese investors hold nearly all the yen debt that is issued outside
Japan, yen shares for issuing countries other than Japan are set to zero for investors from
35Bank of Japan data show the currency composition and amount of Japanese foreign long-term debt
assets. When compared with the BIS currency denomination issuance data set, we see that eﬀectively all
yen-denominated debt issued outside Japan is held by Japanese investors.
36That is, if US, European, and Japanese investors all hold debt in Brazil and Brazil issues debt in local
currency, dollars, euro, and yen, then the US investor most likely holds dollar debt, the Japanese investor
most likely holds more yen debt and the European investor most likely holds more euro debt.
30outside Japan.37 Finally, the ECB reports that euro area investors hold 66 percent of
euro-denominated debt that is issued by non-EMU countries. In this way, the level of euro-
denominated debt issued by a non-EMU country that is held by investors outside the euro
area is set equal to 34 percent of the total euro denominated debt issued by the country.
Accordingly, these adjusted levels are the basis for calculating the currency composition
of the foreign portfolio debt held by investors from the rest of the world. Then, we can
combine the geographical holdings for a country with the ‘residual’ currency composition
of all of the countries where a country holds debt to generate the currency composition of
its foreign portfolio debt.38
For individual members of the euro area, our procedure is as follows. First, we
sum across the euro area members to get the total holdings of the euro area in each host
country. Consistent with the approach described earlier, we assume that the total holdings
of the euro area in country A is distributed between euro-denominated debt (equal to 66
percent of the total euro-denominated debt issued by country A) and debt denominated in
other currencies. With respect to the latter, the currency denomination is allocated along
the lines of the rest of world data described above (using the non-euro proportions, after
removing US holdings and yen-issued debt outside Japan). At that point, we have the
currency denomination of debt assets held by individual euro area countries across each
host destination. This does not generate the same currency weights for each euro area
member, since each country has a diﬀerent geographical pattern in its portfolio.
A.1.4 Other Debt
From the BIS, we obtained the breakdown between ‘domestic currency’ and ‘foreign cur-
rency’ components for the bilateral foreign assets and liabilities of the banks residents in
twenty reporter countries vis-à -vis a large number of counterpart countries over 1977-2005
37This is not to say that no country holds yen debt except Japan. Simply, most countries hold yen-
denominated securities issued by Japanese entities. When another country issues yen debt, it is typically
bought by Japanese investors.
38That is, for all other investors, we assume a uniform currency distribution in relation to the international
bonds issued by a given host country. In this way, diﬀerences in currency exposures among investor countries
are driven by dispersion in the geographical distribution of their foreign portfolio debt assets: country A
that mostly invests in countries that predominantly issue dollar-denominated bonds faces diﬀerent country
risks compared to country B that mostly targets countries that issue euro-denominated debt.
31(on a locational basis).39404142The reporters are the dominant banking centers and, despite
the small number, capture the bulk of world bank holdings. When looking at the reporters’
assets, 72 to 90 percent of them are in other reporter countries. Furthermore, Turkey, the
one reporter most representative of the other non reporters has 90 percent of its assets and
91 percent of its liabilities in other reporter countries. Thus, when we use the liabilities of
the reporters to infer the assets of the non-reporters, we expect to have good coverage.
We begin with the reporter country asset positions. In calculating the currency com-
position of non-portfolio debt assets, the ‘domestic currency’ data are useful, since this
tells us the levels of dollar-denominated foreign assets owned by the US banking system,
yen-denominated foreign assets for Japanese banks and so on.
Regarding the ‘foreign currency’ component, a candidate strategy is to allocate this
across the major currencies, in line with the aggregate currency shares in foreign currency
assets and liabilities that are reported by the BIS. (Of course, our estimates would be
more accurate, if it were possible to directly obtain the detailed currency breakdown of
the ‘foreign currency’ component for individual countries.) Furthermore, for those host
countries that are also reporting countries (where most of the assets lie), we also know
the ‘domestic currency’ versus ‘foreign currency’ split in terms of the foreign liabilities of
its banking system. If we assume that this proportion is representative for the claims of
foreign banks in that country, then we only need to use the ‘world’ averages for the non-
host currency component of the foreign-currency element of the foreign bank claims held by
other reporting countries in that destination. Again, because reporters are the dominant
banking locations, we are only using world averages for a relatively small portion of assets.
We can make inferences about the currency composition of the foreign assets of the
banking systems of non-reporting countries by using the data on currency composition
of the foreign liabilities of the banking systems of the reporting countries. These data
reveal the geographical pattern of the foreign claims of non-reporting countries vis-à-vis
the reporters and the split between the ‘domestic currency’ and the ‘foreign currency’
components for each reporter. Because the reporters are dominant currencies, much of
39Although the foreign assets and liabilities of the banking sector include portfolio items, the currency
composition of the aggregate should be a good proxy for the predominant non-portfolio debt component.
See also BIS (2003, 2006).
40Clearly, our study would be enhanced if we could obtain these data for a larger number of reporting
countries.
41The use of the locational data follows balan c eo fp a y m e n t sa c c o u n t i n gp r i n c i p l e s .
42Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c), some national central banks report the currency composition
of the foreign assets and liabilities of the “monetary and ﬁnancial institutions” sector.
32their banking liabilities (and hence non-reporters assets) are in their own currency and
directly known (for example, 89 percent of the US liabilities are in US dollars). In turn, we
can allocate the ‘foreign currency’ component according to the global distribution reported
by the BIS. Again, although we only have data for twenty reporters, these include all the
major banking centers so that this approach should yield plausible estimates of the currency
composition of the foreign non-portfolio debt assets of the non-reporting countries.
A.1.5 Reserves
The IMF tracks the currency composition of reserves for its member countries, in its COFER
(Currency Composition of Oﬃcial Foreign Exchange Reserves ) database.43 However, for
conﬁdentiality reasons, the only reported COFER data are for major aggregates (world,
industrial country group, developing country group). However, the country-level data have
been used on a few occasions in research by IMF-aﬃliated economists to analyze the deter-
minants of cross-country and time series variation in the currency composition of reserves.
We exploit the results from these papers to model currency composition.
The major starting point is Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000). In this paper, the
authors run separate regressions by currency to predict the share of reserves held in that
currency. The independent variables are trade shares with major currency countries, share
of debt denominated in these currencies, and exchange rate regime relations with these
countries. 44 A ni m p o r t a n ta s p e c to ft h i sw o r ki st h a ti ti sn o ts i m p l yt h et r a d es h a r e
with the currency in question included in each regression, but trade and debt shares with
the other major currencies are included as well. That way, we can see that having a very
large share of trade with Germany can reduce the share of dollars in reserve holdings, even
controlling for the share of trade with the US. The R2 for these regressions ranges from
0.59 for the US dollar share down to 0.35 for the yen share.
We take the coeﬃcients from these regressions and use them to predict the share for
each of the major currencies (the dollar, the DM (euro after 1999), the Swiss Franc, the
Yen, and the Pound). Once we have predicted values for each currency, we impose an
adding up constraint and re-normalize the results, so that each country has totals that add
up to 100 percent.
43The dataset is described at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm.
44We use trade data from the IMF DOTS database and exchange rate regime data from Shambaugh (2004).
We use debt denomination data from the World Bank GFD database, augmenting with BIS issuance data
w h e r en e c e s s a r y . W eu s et h eW o r l dB a n kd a t aa sas t a r t ing point to be consistent with Eichengreen and
Mthieson.
33To ensure that the results match information about world totals and can adjust over
time with world trends, we make one more adjustment. The constants reported in the
Eichengreen-Mathieson regressions are time invariant. We assume that these constants
could have been allowed to vary over time and alter them such that world totals for our
predicted reserves holdings match the world averages reported in the COFER database.
That is, we multiply the predicted currency shares by each countries’ total reserves holdings
and sum across the world. This gives us the world shares. We subsequently adjust the
constants such that the predicted shares change until the predicted world averages match
the actual world averages. This lets us take into account world trends in reserves holdings
over time. 45
We merge this generated data with actual data on reserves for 2000-2004 for twenty
countries from Truman and Wong (2006) and Wong (2007). For any country for which we
have actual data, we use actual data for those years. Before 2000, we use data from central
banks where available (US, Canada, UK) and blend our model generated data with 2000
actual data where in 1999 we weigh the actual data .9 and the model data .1, for 1998 it
is .8, .2, etc. In practice our estimates were close tot he 2000-4 actual data, so a variety
of blending techniques yielded nearly identical results and our model generated estimates
for 2000-4 were quite similar to the actual numbers for most of the twenty countries in
question.
We can further conﬁrm that our predictions are sensible by drawing on two additional
sources of information. First, some countries occasionally report their reserves shares in
announcements or media interviews. Relying on news reports of these currency shares, we
compare predicted with actual (or at least reported, since there is no veriﬁcation) reserves
shares. Our results seem to perform quite well on this measure. Countries like Sweden
that report roughly equal dollar and euro reserves show 40 percent dollar and 50 percent
euro reserves in our calculations. China, who is reported to hold roughly 70 percent dollar,
20 percent euro and 10 percent other currencies, is found to hold 70-75 percent dollar,
approximately 15 percent euro, and 10-15 percent other in our calculations (over various
45To make the adjustment, we increase (decrease) the constants used to make the predicted values for each
currency by the amount that currency is under (over) predicted when compared to world averages. Then
the new predicted values are calculated and the predicted world averages recalculated and again compared
to the actual world averages. The iterations are continued until there is a near perfect match between
predicted and actual world holdings by currency. The constants that would generate predictions that match
the world average are not in fact uniquely determined, but this process brings us to a set of constants as
close as possible to the time invariant ones reported in the empirical work, and small diﬀerences in the
constants make virtually no diﬀerence to the ﬁnal results.
34recent years). In general, non-EMU European countries tend to hold 40-50 percent each in
dollars and euro in our work; Latin American countries tend to hold mostly dollars, Asian
countries hold largely dollars with some yen and euro as well, and all these ﬁgures seem to
mesh reasonably well with the scattered media reports on the subject.
Second, Ewe-Hhee Lim (2006) studies the changing international role of the euro and
dollar and gives some regional information on the currency composition of reserves. Again,
due to conﬁdentiality, the results are deliberately reported in a way to make it diﬃcult to
back out actual currency composition, but we can use these results as a broad check. Lim
breaks countries into two groups that we can try to replicate: a dollar-oriented group of
Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and other dollar pegs; as well as a Euro-oriented bloc of
countries neighboring the euro area plus much of Africa. We aggregate our synthetic country
level reserve shares into the same groups. Because the exact members of each group are not
reported, we cannot precisely compare our results, and thus we cannot expect to exactly
match his output, but these results provide a useful benchmark. Looking at the most recent
data for 2004, world average shares were 67 percent US dollar and 25 percent euro. Lim
shows the dollar bloc holding 76 percent dollar and 19 percent euro while we ﬁnd 71 percent
dollar and 21 percent euro. The euro bloc holds 33 percent dollar and 57 percent euro in
his grouping while we ﬁnd 46 percent dollar and 50 percent euro. We see that our work
moves countries towards their actual data from the starting point of the world averages in
both cases. As with the media reports, we do not have perfect matches, but we have a
reasonable agreement between our data and our available cross-checks.
A.2 Foreign Liabilities
The liability side of the international balance sheet is divided into four groups: portfo-
lio equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, and other debt. In many cases, the source
information for portfolio and other debt are combined, so we do not try to disaggregate
them.
A.2.1 Portfolio Equity
Consistent with our treatment on the assets side, portfolio equity liabilities are assumed
to be denominated in the currency of the host country. Thus, there is no foreign-currency
exposure from equity liabilities. The size of these liabilities is important in creating total
liability weights, since the larger is the relative share of portfolio equity or FDI liabilities, the
greater the local currency share in liabilities. Thus we only need the size of the liabilities, not
35geography or currency denomination. We return to the way diﬀerent asset class categories
are combined below.
A.2.2 Direct Investment
Direct investment liabilities are assumed to be denominated in the currency of the host
country.46
A.2.3 Portfolio and Other Debt
All debt liabilities are processed in tandem due to data restrictions. We have data from
the BIS banking statistics database on banking liabilities for 20 countries (and the implied
liabilities to the 20 reporters based on reporters’ assets for the remaining countries). In
addition, we know the currency composition of portfolio debt liabilities, based on issuance
data from the BIS international securities database for 113 reporting countries.
However, neither database includes information on the currency composition of debt
owed to oﬃcial creditors (bilateral or multilateral oﬃcial debt), which is a prominent source
of debt for many developing countries. The World Bank’s Global Development Finance
database shows that debt to oﬃcial creditors ranges from 35 percent to 53 percent of total
developing country debt over the time period 1990-2004. The World Bank does report
the currency composition of aggregate external debt which merges bank, bond and oﬃcial
debt data. Due to the importance of the oﬃcial debt composition, we use this World Bank
source for all countries where it is available (it is not available for any industrial country
and is missing for a small number of developing countries).47
For the remaining countries, we create bond-based weights using the currency com-
position from BIS issuance data and weights for other debt from the BIS banking data.
These two weights are merged together to create total debt currency composition weights.
The bond based weights are simply a reﬂection of the currency shares of debt issued by
the country. The banking shares follow a similar procedure as other debt assets. For the
twenty reporting countries, we know location of all bank liabilities and can use the break-
down of domestic versus foreign currency to determine the extent to which liabilities are
in the home currency. Then for locations that are also reporters, we can derive from that
46As noted earlier, we plan to reﬁne this choice in a future iteration. The stock of direct investment liabil-
ities includes both equity and debt components. The debt component may at least in part be denominated
in the currency of the parent entity or in other major international currencies.
47For the handful of developing countries that show domestic currency international issuance in the BIS
database, we adjust the World Bank currency shares to include the domestic currency issuances.
36country’s assets how much is in that country’s currency (it is reported as domestic currency
in the reporter’s assets). For the remainder, we allocate based on world totals. For the few
countries that are neither reporters nor have data in the World Bank database, we rely on
the assets of the reporters to determine location and currency of their liabilities. Again,
the reporters are involved in one side or the other of the bulk of banking transactions and
we thus have fairly good coverage. See the discussion of other debt assets for details.
A.3 Measurement Error
Our approach calculates the currency composition of the international balance sheet on the
basis of: (a) the categorical composition of foreign assets and liabilities between equity and
debt components; and (b) the currency composition of debt assets and liabilities. We view
the categorical composition of the international balance sheet as reasonably well measured,
subject to the limitations discussed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007a). The main
qualiﬁcation relates to direct investment positions: these are recorded at market value
for some major countries but at book value for most countries. While there is a lack of
agreement on which is the most robust measurement technique, the diﬀerences in method
may qualify some comparisons across countries.
In relation to the currency composition of privately-held debt assets, we have made use
of data on the geographical distribution of portfolio debt and bank debt assets, together
with data on the currency composition of portfolio debt issuance and cross-border bilateral
bank positions. For oﬃcially-held debt assets (foreign exchange reserves), we have relied on
regression-based estimates. On the debt liability side, we have relied on oﬃcial World Bank
estimates of the currency composition of external debt for developing countries, and com-
bined the data on portfolio debt issuance and the currency composition of bank liabilities
for the advanced economies.
Clearly, these calculations are subject to measurement error, but it is important to
be clear what the scope for error is. For most advanced countries, we have actual data
on the geographical distribution of assets and do not need our model imputed data. In
addition, many of these countries were the ones with highest quality data in the EWN
and actual data on reserves. Thus, error on these countries is low. In addition, countries
without equity data, for example, tended to have very low shares of equity, so the use of
model imputed data was relatively unimportant. Also, for many of the developing countries
that needed large amounts of model imputed data, their exchange rate moves dramatically
against the entire rest of the world, so precise distribution across diﬀerent major currencies
37becomes less important for them. Finally, some of our results, notably the results on foreign
currency exposure, aggregates the foreign currencies meaning these results do not rely on
the currency of reserves or the precise distribution of various other foreign currency assets
and liabilities as much as simply knowing which are foreign and which are domestic.
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41Table 1: Correlations between Financial and Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate Indices
Group Statistic Assets Assets Liabilities Net Finance Exports
Liabilities Trade Trade Trade Imports
All mean 0.96 0.90 0.86 -0.30 0.95
median 0.98 0.95 0.92 -0.72 0.98
Advanced mean 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.41 0.97
median 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.70 0.98
Dev. & Emging mean 0.96 0.90 0.86 -0.47 0.95
median 0.99 0.96 0.95 -0.82 0.98
Developing mean 0.96 0.88 0.84 -0.61 0.94
median 0.99 0.95 0.94 -0.89 0.97
Emerging mean 0.94 0.93 0.88 -0.13 0.98
median 0.97 0.97 0.95 -0.37 0.99
Correlations between the percentage change in monthly Financial and Trade-weighted Ex-
change Rates Indices. Monthly data, 1990.1-2004.12. Full sample of countries.
42Table 2: Exchange Rate Volatility: Financial and Trade-Weighted Exchange Rates
Group Statistic Trade Net Assets Liabilities
All Mean 0.123 0.050 0.140 0.105
Median 0.066 0.023 0.067 0.055
Advanced Mean 0.050 0.013 0.058 0.035
Median 0.046 0.010 0.053 0.034
Dev. & Emging Mean 0.140 0.058 0.159 0.122
Median 0.081 0.028 0.071 0.068
Developing Mean 0.133 0.069 0.153 0.121
Median 0.071 0.035 0.064 0.068
Emerging Mean 0.158 0.036 0.173 0.123
Median 0.090 0.021 0.101 0.071
Sudden Stops mean % ∆ 44% -8% 54% 41%
Big Change mean % ∆ 88% -30% 107% 88%
Standard deviation of monthly changes in exchange rate indices over 1994-2004, full sample
of countries. The bottom panel shows percentage change in these indices during ﬁnancial
crises where Sudden Stops represent sudden stop observations and Big Change represents
large depreciations (over 50 percent) against the relevant base currency.
43Table 3: Comovement of Asset- and Liability-Weighted Exchange Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Advanced Dev. & Emg. Developing Emerging
∆INDA
it 0.77 0.66 0.77 0.77 0.77
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
R2 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.94
N 1499 308 1191 802 389
Countries 117 22 95 65 30
Fixed-eﬀects panel estimation over 1994-2004 regressing the annual percentage change in
the liability index on the annual percentage change in the asset index.
44Table 4: Aggregate Foreign Currency Exposure
1994 2004
mean median mean median
FXagg
All -0.24 -0.26 -0.04 -0.03
Advanced 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.09
Dev. & Emging -0.31 -0.43 -0.08 -0.10
Developing -0.42 -0.47 -0.15 -0.18
Emerging -0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.06
NETFX
All -0.31 -0.22 0.11 -0.04
Advanced 0.17 0.08 0.51 0.36
Dev. & Emging -0.45 -0.36 0.00 -0.13
Developing -0.73 -0.52 -0.21 -0.22







it ∗ IFIit−1. Sample includes the 102
countries with data from 1994 to 2004.
45Table 5: Decomposition of Shift in Aggregate Foreign Currency Exposure, 1994-2004




1 25 -0.09 -0.34 0.04 -0.07 -0.15 -0.17 0.28 0.12
2 25 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.12 0.12
3 26 0.26 0.19 0.34 0.07 0.01 -0.21 0.00 0.15
4 26 0.48 0.34 0.92 0.16 -0.02 -0.29 0.04 0.04
All 102 0.20 -0.34 0.92 0.06 -0.05 -0.19
Advanced 22 0.08 -0.14 0.50 0.03 -0.25 -0.24
EMU 11 -0.001 -0.14 0.41 0.01 -0.52 -0.42
Non-EMU 11 0.15 -0.04 0.50 0.06 0.02 -0.07
Dev. & Emging 80 0.23 -0.34 0.92 0.06 0.00 -0.17
Developing 52 0.27 -0.26 0.92 0.08 0.00 -0.17
Emerging 28 0.15 -0.34 0.63 0.03 0.00 -0.18
Top panel shows the change in FXAGG
it from 1994-2004 split across quartiles of the size
of the change. ∆sA
it represents the change in the share of assets in total IFI, ∆ωA
it shows
the change in the foreign currency share of foreign assets, and ∆ωL
it represents the change
in foreign currency share of liabilities. The ﬁnal two columns show the percentage of each
quartile which is EMU and non-EMU industrial countries.
46Table 6: Factors underlying the shift FXAGG





quartile obs Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 25 0.21 0.05 -0.18 -0.18 0.09 0.08 -0.13 -0.01
2 25 0.30 0.36 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.00
3 26 0.42 0.46 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.20 -0.01 0.00
4 26 0.50 0.58 0.43 0.37 0.27 0.26 -0.03 0.00
All 102 0.37 0.41 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.15 -0.06 0.00
Advanced 22 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.27 -0.20
EMU 11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.53 -0.51
non-EMU 11 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.02
Dev. & Emging 80 0.47 0.52 0.15 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.00
Developing 52 0.51 0.54 0.28 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.00
Emerging 28 0.40 0.46 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 0.18 -0.01 0.00
∆Res/∆A represents the share of asset growth which comes from reserves.




the change in the portfolio equity and FDI shares of liabilities. ∆DebtLFC represents the
change in the foreign currency share of Debt Liabilities. 1994-2004.
47Table 7: Decomposition of Shift in NETFX, 1994-2004
Quartile obs mean min max ∆FXAGG
it ∆IFI EMU Non-EMU
1 23 -0.07 -0.52 0.04 -0.04 0.78 0.22 0.00
2 24 0.15 0.08 0.24 0.16 0.56 0.17 0.17
3 24 0.36 0.25 0.50 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.13
4 25 1.17 0.51 3.11 0.33 0.65 0.08 0.16
All 96 0.41 -0.52 3.11 0.20 0.57
Advanced 22 0.30 -0.52 1.40 0.07 2.18
EMU 11 0.14 -0.52 0.91 0.00 2.89
Non-EMU 11 0.46 0.11 1.40 0.15 1.47
Dev. & Emging 74 0.45 -0.25 3.11 0.23 0.09
Developing 48 0.52 -0.14 3.11 0.27 -0.21
Emerging 26 0.32 -0.25 2.53 0.15 0.64
1994-2004.
48Table 8: Co-Variates of Foreign Currency Exposure
constant -89.3 -128.7 -207.0 -171.3 -112.2 -126.9
(8.5)*** (17.8)*** (74.2)*** (80.5)** (10.7)*** (20.1)***
GDP-PC 10.8 13.9 21.6 18.0 14.3 14.4
(1.03)*** (2.3)*** (7.5)*** (8.9)* (1.47)*** (2.51)***
Trade 0.1 0.03 0.066
(.047)** (.11) (.06)
Inst. Qual. -4.4 -5.2 -0.63
(4.3) (10.6) (5.4)




adj.R2 0.41 0.45 0.28 0.44 0.41 0.39
N 119 113 22 22 97 91
Cross-Section in 2004. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
*,**,*** denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
49Table 9: The Valuation Channel and Dynamics of Net Foreign Asset Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Adv. Dev. Eme.
VALxr 1.071 0.574 1.095 0.982
(0.05)** (0.14)** (0.05)** (0.12)**
Constant 0.724 -0.969 2.529 -1.745
(0.15)** (0.07)** (0.25)** (0.18)**
N 1496 304 802 390
R2 0.65 0.09 0.72 0.51
R2 (no FE) 0.54 0.06 0.61 0.42
Panel estimation over 1994-2004. Columns (1)-(4) estimated by least squares with country
ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors clustered by country. Bottom row shows R-squared when
regressions are run without country ﬁxed eﬀects. Coeﬃcients are nearly unchanged with
or without ﬁxed eﬀects.
50Table 10: VALX as a Percent of GDP
Mean Median 75% 90%
All 5.0 1.7 4.3 11.2
Advanced 2.4 1.2 2.8 5.0
Dev. & Emging 5.7 1.8 4.7 12.6
Developing 6.8 2.3 5.3 15.8
Emerging 3.4 1.2 3.8 10.0
ρ(VA L ) ρ(VA L xr) ρ(VA L mp)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All 0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.01
Advanced -0.01 -0.06 0.15 0.15 -0.05 -0.04
EMU -0.02 -0.04 0.20 0.16 -0.01 -0.04
Non-EMU 0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.14 -0.09 -0.03
Developing 0.02 -0.001 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.03
Panel A: Distribution of absolutes values of VA L XR as a ratio to GDP. Panel B: mean and
median within country autocorrelation coeﬃcients of diﬀerent valuation eﬀects.
51Table 11: Eﬀects of a 20 percent Depreciation of the US Dollar
Trade Net Financial VA L xr
G r o u p m e a nm e d i a nm e a nm e d i a nm e a nm e d i a n
All -2.6 -1.5 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Advanced -1.3 -1.3 -0.7 -0.7 -3.3 -1.7
EMU -1.3 -1.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.9 -0.5
Non-EMU -1.2 -2.0 -1.1 -1.6 -4.8 -5.1
Developing -2.8 -1.2 2.7 3.0 3.5 3.1
Emerging -3.2 -2.5 -0.5 -0.7 -2.9 -0.8
Percentage change in Trade and Net Financial indices in the case of a 20 percent across the
board depreciation of the US dollar, plus the implied valuation changes.
52Figure 1: Distribution of Correlation between Net Financial and Trade-Weighted Ex-
change Rate Indices: All Countries.
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55Figure 4: Foreign Currency Exposure and International Financial Integration in 1994
and 2004
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